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ANECDOTAGE 
Leonard W. Levy* 
Justice Felix Frankfurter was probably the foremost influ-
ence on my thinking about the Supreme Court. In 1953, as a 
young instructor at Brandeis University, I had published several 
articles lambasting judicial decisions that sustained Jim Crow 
laws. One of the articles appeared in The New Republic, for 
which Frankfurter had regularly written about the Court when he 
was a professor at Harvard Law School. Professor Frankfurter 
could be censurious and biting. My own articles were written in a 
similar spirit. One, which apparently outraged Frankfurter, dealt 
with "frauds and fallacies" in the law of segregation. I savaged 
not only Plessy v. Ferguson but decisions following Plessy, includ-
ing the 1927 case of Gong Lum v. Rice,t in which the Court sus-
tained a Mississippi ruling that classified a Chinese child as black 
and segregated her. 
Frankfurter wrote a letter to my boss at Brandeis, his good 
friend Max Lerner, demanding to know who was the arrogant 
young instructor who dared to criticize even opinions of the 
Court that the "revered" Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and 
Louis D. Brandeis had joined. Showing me Frankfurter's letter, 
Lerner suggested that I answer it and give him a copy. The re-
sponse took a couple of weeks, as I researched the law on fraud; 
I defended my view of the Court's failures, covering not only the 
law of segregation but, on the issue of genteel criticism, prece-
dents of rancorous language by Professor Frankfurter. My letter 
led to a correspondence and as a result, Frankfurter invited me to 
Washington as his guest to hear the arguments in Brown v. Board 
of Education. He also asked me to meet him in his chambers. 
The moment I entered his chambers, Frankfurter sharply ex-
claimed, "There's that damn Jeffersonian liberal!" He starting 
baiting me and finally succeeded in provoking an argument in 
which I sought to defend liberal judicial activism rather than judi-
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cial self-restraint. At the time, I was considering a book on the 
Court and the Bill of Rights, in which I expected to champion the 
position of Hugo Black. Frankfurter made several sharp remarks 
about Black's inconsistencies and against Black's activist im-
pulses. He also was remarkably spirited in slamming my views. 
The argument grew intense and I lost my sense of deference. I 
must have been brazen in my counter-assault, discrediting sev-
eral of Frankfurter's opinions for inconsistencies. 
While talking animatedly, and pacing before his big desk, I 
suddenly noticed that Frankfurter's face was vividly reddening. 
Then the slight, distinguished-looking scholarly jurist rose from 
his high-backed chair and slowly approached me with a clenched 
fist. I froze and thought, "My God, I'm going to be struck by a 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States." He came 
around the side of the desk, walked right up to me, flushed and 
tightfisted, and suddenly, poking a finger under my nose, he de-
clared, "Good point, young man!" Then he returned to his chair, 
sat back, and beamed at me. He seemed delighted that I had 
supported my argument even at his expense. 
Frankfurter taught me to criticize my most cherished beliefs 
by demanding valid evidence for any proposition. I learned to 
see at least two sides to every question and to appreciate the val-
ues of judicial self-restraint even more than those of judicial ac-
tivism. Frankfurter became, for me, a model of intellectual 
rectitude. And he became a friend. He invited me to his home 
whenever I was in Washington. Once, when lunching with him, I 
was thrilled to hear him tell his servant to hold all calls "except 
from Dean" (Acheson). I had the pleasure of presenting Frank-
furter with an honorary degree at Brandeis University. 
He was instrumental in my receiving a Guggenhim Fellow-
ship. I had a good project and several all-star scholars as refer-
ences, including Paul Freund and Mark Howe of the Harvard 
Law School, and Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris 
of the Columbia University Department of History, but I have 
always believed that Frankfurter's letter made the difference. 
The Secretary-General of Guggenheim Foundation was a man 
with a formidable reputation, the greatly respected Henry Allen 
Moe. Frankfurter wrote him the following letter, with a copy to 
me: "Dear Moe: Levy is a very bright young man. Someday he 
may write something important. Give him a fellowship. Felix 
Frankfurter." The fellowship enabled me to begin research on 
the origins of the right against self-incrimination, eventually re-
sulting in a book that won the Pulitzer Prize. Frankfurter was 
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important, too, in helping me decide whether I should accept the 
offer to become the first Dean of the Graduate School of Arts 
and Sciences at Brandeis University. I wanted the position but 
felt guilty about betraying scholarship. Frankfurter, in response 
to my request for advice, urged me to accept, saying that Edward 
Gibbon could never have written his Decline and Fall had he not 
had the experience of being a sergeant-major in the British army. 
I did not know at the time that he probably never was, but I 
accepted the Deanship. 
Hugo Black was scarcely as open minded as Frankfurter. 
Black once rebuked me for not having submitted the manuscript 
of my book, Legacy of Suppression, for criticism by people who 
agreed with his absolutist interpretation of freedom on the press. 
Black was always the partisan: Justice Black differed not much 
from Senator Black. A former clerk to Black once told me that 
Black had underlined much of the book and made aspersive mar-
ginal asides. The Justice required him to spend an entire summer 
checking the footnotes and sources for Legacy of Suppression, 
looking for mistakes. He found none. Black, he said, insisted 
that the book was wrong even if its facts were right, because of its 
interpretation. I thought the evidence dictated the 
interpretation. 
A close friend of Black's, Professor Edmond Cahn of New 
York University Law School, tried to persuade him that Legacy 
of Suppression had some merit. Cahn reviewed the book very 
favorably for the New York Herald Tribune Book Section and 
recommended it to Black. In the first draft of his reply to Cahn, 
Black wrote of Legacy, "In brief my judgment is that it is proba-
bly one of the most devastating blows that has been delivered 
against civil liberty in American for a long time." I do not know 
whether Black ranked me above or below Joe McCarthy. In any 
case, he regretted that, despite Cahn's description of me as a 
"great libertarian," I "had seen fit to take this reactionary view 
of the First Amendment's purposes." Cahn assured Black that 
the First Amendment would survive my book, but Black moodily 
replied, "I hope you are right but I am afraid you are not in be-
lieving that Dean Levy's book has done no damage to the First 
Amendment." Black absolutely refused to read my Jefferson and 
Civil Liberties: the Darker Side, because the subtitle indicated 
that he would disagree with my viewpoint. He was no different 
from the great Jeffersonian scholar, Julian Boyd, editor of Jeffer-
son's papers, who admitted that he had not read the book but 
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condemned it anyway, because, he wrote, if I was right, he had 
wasted the best years of his life. 
Frankfurter's reaction to Legacy of Suppression had been 
wholly favorable. In a letter to me he said he found the book 
"fortifying and cheering" at a time when too many professing lib-
erals succumbed to what Brandeis called the most odious of doc-
trines, that the "good justifies the means." Frankfurter wrote me 
that he would "rather have said what you say of all than have 
written McCulloch v. Maryland" -high praise because Frank-
furter thought that the opinion by John Marshall was the greatest 
in our history 
In Brown v. Board of Education, Thurgood Marshall, then 
leader of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, answered the argu-
ments of counsel who defended segregation. Shortly after he 
concluded, the Court adjourned and I returned to Frankfurter's 
chambers. We were chatting when Justice Robert S. Jackson 
burst into the room and, without taking any notice of me, blurted 
out excitedly, "Wasn't that colored fellow magnificent! He sim-
ply creamed John W. Davis." Frankfurter, obviously upset by 
Jackson's breach of judicial reticence in the presence of an out-
sider, broke in on him, introduced me to him, and changed the 
subject. It had been an electrifying moment. Later, according to 
scholars, Jackson was indecisive for a while on the outcome of 
the case. I had glimpsed a different Jackson. 
Chief Justice Earl Warren arrived in Boston on a cold No-
vember day in 1957 to spend the Commencement weekend at 
Brandeis and to receive an honorary degree. I presented him 
and was his host on behalf of the university for the weekend. 
Warren carried informality to extremes. I went to the hotel 
dressed in a tuxedo to meet him and escort him to a formal din-
ner. Learning his room number at the hotel desk, I knocked at 
his door. He did not inquire who was knocking. In a hearty 
voice he just boomed out, "Come in, come in! It's open." I 
opened the door and walked in to see the Chief Justice of the 
United States, a big ruddy man, standing there before me in his 
old-fashioned BVDs. The next day, when we had some time to-
gether, he wore a tom baggy sweater as we composed a speech 
for him to deliver to an interfaith meeting a few days later. 
When the weekend was over, I was glad to take Warren back 
to Logan Airport to catch his plane. The intense activities at 
school and being on my best behavior with the Chief Justice had 
wearied me. That Sunday afternoon was unnaturally cold and 
windy. The heating system at Eastern Airlines wasn't working 
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properly. We stood in a long line of overcoated people as we 
awaited the call for Warren's plane to be boarded. An official of 
the airlines recognized Warren and approached us, saying, "Mr. 
Chief Justice, kindly step this way to our VIP room. It has a hot-
air heater, and we will be glad to make you comfortable while 
you wait and give you a drink." I was relieved at the prospect of 
the rescue, but Warren astonished and dismayed me when he re-
plied: "Thank you so very much. I should be pleased to accept 
your offer. And," with a sweeping gesture of his arm, "all these 
good folk in line are invited too?" The flustered airline official 
replied that he could not accommodate more than the two of us 
because the VIP facilities were too small. Warren quietly re-
sponded, "In that case, I'll just wait here, thank you." We waited 
our tum with everyone else. The press had not been present. 
The sentiments Warren expressed were genuine. He was a folksy 
democrat and would accept no special favors. 
That episode with Warren reminds me of a later time when I 
had lunch with Eleanor Roosevelt in the faculty dining room at 
Brandeis. On the way out, she excused herself and walked 
through the doorway leading to the kitchen. I thought she had 
made a mistake and followed her into the kitchen to advise her 
on the location of the ladies' room. I found that she was where 
she wanted to be, shaking hands with the cooks and waitresses, 
thanking them for lunch. 
Thurgood Marshall on another occasion was also a degree 
recipient whom I presented. At the time, in 1961, he was the 
Solicitor General of the United States, having resigned a seat on 
the federal court of appeals. I addressed him as Judge Marshall, 
but he was as relaxed and informal as a big puppy. He affected 
slangy speech and a buddy-buddy attitude. At breakfast, he 
asked me whether I had seen the New York Times story on the 
Freedom Riders. A racially-mixed group of young people riding 
a bus through the South had been set upon in Anniston, Ala-
bama. Their bus had been overturned and burned. We discussed 
the episode for a few minutes, and Marshall then confided in me, 
"You know, I could never have joined them. I just couldn't have 
been a Freedom Rider." Not quite believing him, I asked, "Why 
not?" "It's my back," he replied, "I have a broad yellow streak 
up my back" -and he roared with laughter. 
A wholly different sort of person was Chief Justice Warren 
Burger, whom I first met in Birmingham in 1976 on the occasion 
of the centennial of Justice Black's birth. We were both speakers 
at the event. Burger was said to have arrived in a private plane, 
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and he took the entire top floor of the hotel with his nine body-
guards, who worked eight hour shifts in batches of three each. I 
have never met a more starchy person than Burger. Pomposity 
enshrouded him like a miasma that blanketed him with his own 
sense of self-importance. 
I resented the treatment accorded to me as well as others 
when a party was given for the speakers. Before we could enter 
the room, Burger's guards frisked us for weapons and searched 
brief cases and purses. I tried to engage him in conversation but 
was as unsuccessful as others. In 1971 the Court had decided, in 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents,z that the Fourth Amendment 
permits damage suits for injuries sustained in an illegal federal 
search. Burger had dissented in an opinion recommending that 
Congress should enact a statute establishing a remedy against the 
government in order to provide compensation for persons whose 
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. It was an interest-
ing idea. Moreover, the Court had merely held that the wronged 
individual had a right to sue. I wondered what had happened 
subsequently. So I asked Burger about the outcome of the case 
when it was returned to the lower courts. Did Bivens win his 
suit? Did Congress ever give consideration to Burger's idea? He 
seemed not to know what I was speaking about and when I tried 
to explain, to remind him of the case, he grunted, "I don't know" 
and turned away. 
At another Commencement, Brandeis University honored 
the two Massachusetts senators, Leverett Saltonstall and John F. 
Kennedy. My colleague, John P. Roche, had the luck of present-
ing the junior senator, Kennedy, while I was assigned to Salton-
stall, a stuffy fellow. The four of us spent considerable time 
together. When the marshal of the academic procession called 
out that we would march out in five minutes, Kennedy excused 
himself. He leaned against a wall, pulled an envelope out of his 
pocket, and made notes on it for a few minutes. At the Com-
mencement, Saltonstall read a dull speech for an hour. When 
Kennedy got his tum, he put the envelope before him on the 
lectern and spoke brilliantly for about ten minutes in beautiful 
English and with some wit. He received a grand ovation. 
2. 403 u.s. 388 (1971). 
